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STORIES, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND
IMPROVED VERDICTS
Randolph N Jonakait *
How should DNA typing and the probabilities it generates affect
decisions and inferences in litigation? This question could just be
treated in an abstract, theoretical manner, but DNA profiling is too
important to be consigned solely to academic discussions. DNA pro-
filing is too important because lives are irrevocably affected by it, and
the issues raised extend far beyond forensic applications of DNA
technology.
These are some of the lessons I drew from the case that dragged
me into this field a decade ago.' An Orthodox Jew had been stabbed
to death in an apparent robbery attempt and a Jewish sect invaded
and occupied the local precinct house. A police task force was assem-
bled and quickly arrested three youths.
Jose had been caught fleeing another robbery during which the
victim had been stabbed. He first told the police that he had been in a
nightclub with friends at the time of the killing. About twenty-four
hours later, after he was told that his brother Jimmy and his friend
J.R. had been arrested for the killing, Jose changed his story and
stated that he was the lone killer. He was by himself, he maintained,
when he asked the victim for a match. The victim looked frightened
and struck at him. Jose swung back with a knife, which he dropped.
When he retrieved it, Jose contended the victim kicked him. As Jose
came up, he stabbed the man.
Jose's statement, however, was not the sole basis for the prosecu-
tion. The prosecutor also relied on the testimony of Michael, an eye-
witness, who had been given immunity. Michael, a sometime petty
thief and a sometime Avon cosmetics salesman, said he was high that
evening when he met his friends, the three defendants, Jose, Jimmy,
and J.R. Michael's version of that night changed each time he related
it, but at trial he stated that the four of them were getting hamburgers
when the victim came in seeking change for a telephone call. Jose,
Jimmy, and J.R. talked of robbery and followed the man out of the
Professor, New York Law School.
I People v. Julbe, No. 4167/1978 (Kings County, New York 1979). The trial was com-
pleted in February, 1979 and the unsuccessful appeal was argued in 1982. The case was not
reported, and there seems little point now in stating the identities of those involved. The
descriptions of the case and quotations from it are based upon trial and appellate documents in
the author's possession. Where possible, cites to the trial transcript are given.
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White Castle. Michael trailed, merely wanting to watch what would
happen. Michael swore that he saw Jose grab the man around the
neck and J.R. knock him down. Pockets were searched, and Jose
stabbed the victim. 2
Besides the numerous contradictions within the full report of his
story, other evidence also conflicted with Michael's version. For ex-
ample, although he stated that a woman in her home had witnessed
the murder, the police, after much investigation, could not find her.
Most important, a friend of the victim-another Orthodox Jew-tes-
tified that the victim was prohibited by his religious beliefs from car-
rying money or making telephone calls on the Sabbath, and since the
killing occurred on the Sabbath, his friend would not have had a dol-
lar bill, would not have asked for change, and would not have used a
coin to make a call. The friend explained that at least a portion of
Michael's testimony could not be the truth.3
Jose, through the testimony of numerous witnesses, presented his
alibi. He maintained that the story he originally told the police was
the truth. Jose's friends, relatives, and the president of the club all
testified that Jose was with them at the club at the time of the killing.
Jimmy's witnesses stated that he was at a restaurant at the time of the
crime. J.R. produced no evidence.4
The prosecution, however, presented a forensic serologist, who
testified that he had analyzed the victim's blood and fingernail clip-
pings, dried blood found on clothing worn by Jose when he was ar-
rested, and blood from each of the defendants. The blood was typed
not only for the well-known ABO blood typing system,- but also for
five other proteins using techniques different from those used in ABO
blood typing. The serologist stated that the types discovered in the
victim's blood were also present in the dried blood on Jose's clothing.
He told the jury that only 1.08% of the population had the factors
found in the two samples. The serologist also testified that the vic-
tim's fingernail clippings contained blood. The resulting genetic pro-
file did not match the blood of the victim, Jose, or J.R. However, it
was duplicated in Jimmy's blood. The witness concluded by telling
the jury that 9% of the population had this genetic combination.6
Closing arguments were made and jury instructions given. The jury
2 Trial transcript at 63-414, People v. Julbe [hereinafter Julbe Transcript] (on file with
author).
3 Id. at 512-17.
4 Id. at 524-631.
5 For a description of ABO typing and its applications, see Jonakait, Will Blood Tell?
Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J. 833, 836-38 (1982).
6 Julbe Transcript, supra note 2, at 487-507.
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deliberated and returned with the the verdicts: Jose guilty of inten-
tional and felony murder; Jimmy guilty of felony murder; J.R. guilty
of nothing.
I was assigned to the indigent Jose as his appellate attorney. I
raised a number of issues, which the appellate courts rejected. Jose
stayed in prison serving his life sentence, waiting the required mini-
mum twenty-five years before he might see the parole board. The
case, however, while all too typical in many ways, taught me a lot
about issues concerning forensic science evidence, issues that continue
to be central to the consideration of DNA evidence today. I learned
that this kind of evidence has a powerful effect.
The genetic marker typing was the key proof. The jurors cer-
tainly could not have accepted Jose's confession at face value. If they
had, they would not have convicted Jimmy, who, according to Jose,
was not present. They obviously did not accept Jimmy's or Jose's
alibis, or there would have been no conviction at all. But the jury did
not fully believe Michael, the prosecution's witness, either. If so, all
three defendants would have been found guilty because Michael had
testified that J.R., who was acquitted, was a more active participant in
the crime than Jimmy, who was convicted.
The split verdicts could only be explained by the serological evi-
dence. The two defendants linked by the forensic scientist to the vic-
tim were convicted, while the third, not connected by the blood
typing, went free. Such evidence has an important impact on jury
verdicts.7 Lives, consequently, are irrevocably affected by such foren-
sic science evidence. Jose's certainly was. Jose, slight of build and
slow of wit, did not fare well in prison. He was defenseless against
bigger and more cunning prisoners. He contracted AIDS and died in
jail.
The case, of course, forced me to think about the proper use of
probabilities in trials. I considered whether one in a hundred meant a
99% certainty that Jose was guilty, or a 99% certainty that the blood
came from the victim. I pondered the alternative: that the 1.08% fig-
ure only defined a subset of the population, and that of the eight mil-
lion or so in the region, 80,000 people had blood like that. Neither
alternative seemed right, and I started to read the burgeoning litera-
ture on Bayes' Theorem. This, too, was unsatisfying.
7 A survey has found that jurors believe that they comprehend scientific evidence as well
as or better than other evidence. In addition, "[a]bout one quarter [of jurors who] were
presented with scientific evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would
have changed their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty." Peterson, Ryan, Houlden &
Mihajlovic, The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987).
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Bayesians began from the proposition that the formula was the
correct way to process probabilities. When they found that jurors did
not come out with the same results as the statisticians, the Bayesians
concluded that jurors did not use the evidence properly and suggested
ways to get the jurors to think "correctly." ' This is a disturbing
argument.
The Bayesian analysis ignores the central reasons for our jury
system. We value jurors because we believe that verdicts should be
the product of community values and common sense.9 If the Baye-
sians were correct in concluding that our present jurors are funda-
mentally wrong in how they approach, assimilate, and assess
information, then the jury system must be wrong. By insisting that
jurors abandon their ordinary ways of processing evidence, the Baye-
sians were undercutting the basic value of our juries.
The starting point for improving decision making in trials should
not be an insistence that juror's think in alien ways (probably a fruit-
less goal anyway), but instead should be an understanding of how ju-
rors actually do treat the information presented to them. If that were
grasped, refinements might be found to make that processing better.
This concept, however, was of limited value because so little was
known about how jurors really assimilate and assess evidence.
What I was aware of at this time was how criminal defense attor-
neys instinctively handled information. The good ones, at least
among themselves, referred to "stories." If I sought advice on a trial,
I would hear: "What is the prosecutor's story?" "What is the cli-
ent's?" I might then hear that a fact did not fit a story; or if the story
was right, that this witness or that document should be found. If that
confirming evidence did not exist, then other stories had to be
considered.
The successful attorneys shunned a defense comprised of an in-
consistency here and an improbability there with the hope that, as a
8 See, e.g., Thompson and Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal
Trials.- The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW AND HUM.
BEHAV. 167, 181, 184 (1987) concluding that experiments demonstrate "that people are not
very good at drawing correct inferences" from probabilistic evidence based on the assumption
that Bayes' theorem is the correct way to draw such inferences and reviewing the literature
that proposes the use of Bayes' theorem in trials.
9 The Supreme Court has provided that:
[Tihe purpose of the jury trial... is to prevent oppression by the Government....
Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results
from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1969).
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result, the jury would find a reasonable doubt. Time and again I
heard that this approach was a choice of last resort. This explanation
made sense. Any competent presentation by the prosecution would
form a story. Those jurors favoring the prosecution would have
something to relate in a coherent way during deliberations. The
strongest counter, therefore, was always another narration, or another
way to order the information into coherency, but this time in a way
that pointed towards acquittal. Those jurors favoring the defense
needed a story if they were going to be successful in persuading other
jurors. Thus, at least in my experience, the goal of the criminal de-
fense attorney was to process the information into a story indicating
the client's innocence, or at least into a story that raised a reasonable
doubt about his guilt. Although we could not prove it, we all felt that
stories mattered to juries and affected how information was
processed.10
The thought that stories are important underlined the difficulty
with the forensic science evidence. A probability may be easily
plugged into a mathematical construct, but incorporating it into a co-
herent narrative is difficult. The storytelling art seems stretched to
the limit by the information that the blood at the crime scene and the
defendant's blood share the same types, and that those types occur in
one in every hundred or thousand or million people.
More thought is needed on how to fit such evidence into a sensi-
ble, potentially accurate narrative that can be grasped by jurors."
The conclusion that more needs to be learned in this area, however,
does not mean that the decisions and inferences based on forensic sci-
ence such as DNA typing cannot be improved before we have that
knowledge. Decisions and inferences might be made more wisely if
we improve how people process the resulting information, but those
decisions ought also be improved by presenting the jury with more
accurate and complete data. Certainly, however juries use the expert
testimony, they are more likely to use the expert testimony effectively
if the information and issues concerning that evidence are as complete
10 Today, as much information in this symposium on Decision and Inference in Litigation
indicates, see e.g., Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991);
Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 519 (1991), significantly more empirical data exists demonstrating the impor-
tance of stories for the processing of information by juries.
I I The difficulty of processing or incorporating the probability evidence increased in Jose's
case because the jury did not have certain information. Thus, although testimony indicated
that the victim's blood matched the blood found on Jose and that the typed genetic markers
occurred with a frequency of one in a hundred, the other robbery victim whom Jose stabbed
did not have his blood analyzed. Similarly, neither the blood found under the victim's finger-
nails nor Michael's blood was analyzed.
1991]
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as possible. Jose's case taught me, however, that such complete
presentations are now unlikely. Most participants in our litigation
system are ill-equipped to deal with such scientific evidence, and con-
sequently, the proof and arguments about the scientific information
will be routinely incomplete.
12
Jose's trial attorney was a respected leader of the local bar. He
was an experienced criminal defender, a pro at savage cross-examina-
tion of a government witness like Michael. He could effectively pres-
ent an alibi and give a stirring summation on police coercion. But
when it came to the scientific and mathematical testimony, the adver-
sary system ceased to exist and the evidence was not challenged. The
cross-examination of the forensic scientist was without point. No de-
fense witness testified about the serological evidence. The relevant de-
fense arguments were feeble. Indeed, the attorney told the jury,
"Frankly, I never heard anything like that [scientific evidence]
before." 13 When asked out of the jury's presence why he had not had
the other robbery victim's blood typed to see if it matched that found
on Jose's clothing, the attorney stated, "May I say that the serologist
testified that the blood as found on the shirt could very well and prob-
ably did come from [the murder victim.] So, I couldn't see any benefit
[in having the robbery victim's blood typed.]"' 14
This attorney, unfortunately, was not unusual.'" Many lawyers
12 See A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
7 (3d ed. 1986) stating that:
[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, which ill
equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility of
evidence proffered through expert witnesses. This scientific illiteracy is shared by a
large segment of the trial and appellate bench; many judges simply do not under-
stand evidence based on scientific principles ....
See also McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Ad-
missibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 ORE. L. REV. 19, 25
(1987) ("[M]ost lawyers and judges do not have extensive training or experience in dealing
with scientific matters. Accordingly, many lawyers and judges are uncomfortable dealing with
scientific evidence .... "); Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond
the Adversary Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280, 288 (1980) ("Judges and their clerks are not nor-
mally able to distinguish relevant from irrelevant materials and good science from bad.").
13 Julbe Transcript, supra note 2, at 731.
14 Id. at 844-47.
15 Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note 7, at 1749, have found that:
[D]efense attorneys [use] a variety of tactics ... to challenge forensic science evi-
dence, ranging from efforts to have the evidence ruled inadmissible ... to attacks
on the expert's qualification or intense cross-examination of the expert's conclu-
sions. Usually, however, defense counsel will attempt to 'explain away' the physi-
cal evidence by supplying a reasonable and lawful explanation for its presence. If
the above tactics cannot be used, defense counsel will usually stipulate to the evi-
dence and attempt to draw as little attention to it as possible. Contrary to a com-
monly expressed attitude that defense attorneys distrust the analyses and
[Vol. 13:343
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and judges feel unable to deal with issues raised by forensic science.
Perhaps as a group, attorneys are reasonably bright people who be-
came lawyers partly because they were afraid of science and math.
Perhaps when lawyers lie awake in the dark of night, they fear that
scientists are smarter than they are. If so, lawyers will not examine
the scientific evidence with as much skepticism as they would other
information. As a result, the jury will not be as completely informed
as it ought to be.
The lawyers' fear, avoidance, or ineptitude concerning scientific
issues might matter little if the opinions of forensic scientists could be
accepted as complete and accurate, but experience teaches otherwise.
Forensic scientists' assertions are often misleading. For example, the
serologist testifying at Jose's trial unequivocally proclaimed that the
aging and drying of blood did not destroy it or make it difficult to
detect any of the genetic markers. 1 6 He failed to reveal that almost no
research had been done on the ability to type such factors accurately
in dried blood; he did not testify that the few existing studies had
already revealed false positives. 7 He based his frequency calculations
on data that others might not see as scientific. That population study
had not been published or otherwise analyzed by scientists. 8
This situation is routine. The conclusions of forensic science are
often based on skimpy, nonexistent, or shoddy research. 9 Forensic
testimony of 'prosecution' experts, defense counsel we interviewed are basically
satisfied with the competence and nonpartisanship of forensic scientists with whom
they have contact.
Cf. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 634 (1983) Prof.
Michael Graham commented that: "Often the plaintiff or the prosecution alone calls an expert
who testifies with little or no cross-examination. The opponent more or less accepts the ex-
pert's evidence as being true if it does not concern a major issue in contention." Id. at 634.
Even novel scientific evidence often goes unchallenged. See Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States. A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1197, 1243 (1980) ("a surprising number of novel techniques have gained admissibility without
the presentation of defense expert testimony").
16 Julbe Transcript, supra note 2, at 502.
17 Several years later, I was part of a panel discussion at New York Law School sponsored
by a student organization where this forensic scientist explained the electrophoretic typing of
blood. I was a questioner from the floor. The serologist then said that such factors as heat and
humidity could alter the electrophoretic patterns in aged blood. This would not cause mistyp-
ing, he maintained, because he could tell from the patterns that the degradation had occurred
and, thus, would report inconclusive results. He continued that while it might be useful to
publish a paper on this topic, he had not yet done so.
For a review of the scientific studies examining the typing of these genetic markers, see
Jonakait, supra note 5.
18 Julbe Transcript, supra note 2, at 494-95, 499-501.
19 For a discussion of the often poor and limited nature of forensic science research, see
Jonakait, The Quality of Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
109 (1991).
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scientists do not give juries a thorough presentation of information
about the scientific technique. Seldom have they actually sought to
obtain such data. Indeed, a crucial piece of information-the true
error rates for the scientific procedures-cannot be presented because
these rates are not collected.
No scientific procedure always produces correct results. No
human being is perfect. All scientific analyses have error rates. Those
rates will vary depending upon who performs and interprets the work.
Whether or not the reasons for the errors are understood, they can be
measured, and those measurements can be presented to the decision
maker. The jury, however, does not hear this information because it
is not compiled. It should be collected from a program of mandatory,
blind proficiency testing of forensic laboratories, but such testing,
while easy to institute and administer, does not exist.
Obviously, the worth of a scientific result is affected by how
likely it is to be wrong. The assessment of the conclusion that two
samples match and that only one in 35,000 have similar DNA de-
pends upon whether the forensic scientist is wrong 1% or 10% or
25% of the time when he declares a match. This crucial information
regarding accuracy, however, is not now available and, thus, cannot
be presented to the jury.2" Decisions in litigation can only improve
20 See M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION
76 (1983) which points out that:
[I]n order to determine the significance of test results, fact-finders should be
presented with information regarding the base rates for common phenomena ana-
lyzed by forensic scientists; the accuracy limits of the tests and analytic techniques
used (such limits have been determined for virtually all biomedical laboratory
tests) and the accuracy of the tests in practice, as determined by quality control
studies run on the laboratories.... Judges and lawyers will then have to become
sufficiently conversant with the statistical principles involved in order to employ
these background data in assessing the testimony presented.
While the increased information ought to increase the accuracy of the verdicts, it further
increases the difficulty of presenting a good, potentially accurate story. The story must not
only incorporate one sort of information that does not fit well into a narrative-that the blood
samples matched and the typed factors occur at a rate of one in, say, 35,000. It must now
incorporate more of the same information-the analyst makes a mistake one in ten times-that
reverses the story. If a mistake was made, then the samples did not match. In many cases, if
the blood at the crime scene does not match the defendant's, then the forensic evidence, in-
stead of being powerfully damning, actually shows that the accused is innocent. See Sympo-
sium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 188 (1983), at which Miron Straf
commented:
But to say that the expert passed the test by being correct 95% of the time really
does not help the fact-finder too much, because the issue in question concerns a
particular case to which that probability does not necessarily apply. It would be
additional evidence to be considered, but the distinction between the prior tests
and the specific questions at trial must be made clear.
Id. at 228.
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when factfinders are presented with such data.
A requirement of mandatory, blind proficiency testing should, by
itself, lead to improved decisions and inferences, but it should also
trigger other steps towards improving the DNA profiling procedures.
Although we do not know for certain what the testing program will
reveal, forensic laboratories perform incredibly poorly according to
the available information. Indeed, the test data reveal that inadequate
performances are endemic in our crime labs. The lack of quality is
not limited to particular forensic techniques or restricted to a handful
of laboratories, but affects all procedures and many, if not all,
facilities.2'
The problems with the testing procedures, however, are not in-
tractable. Crime laboratories can be improved. Good regulation of
DNA laboratories will take care of the problems with the testing pro-
cedures, as regulation of clinical laboratories has already estab-
lished.22 The necessity for the improvements is dramatic, and the
knowledge to produce the changes is there. Only whether the will
exists to bring about the necessary changes is in doubt.
Reform in DNA procedures and laboratories can have an impor-
tant effect in improving decisions and inferences in real litigation.
Such an improvement does not depend upon the wishful and wrong
notion that juries can be instructed to some alien, "correct" way of
thinking. The inability of lawyers and judges to grasp scientific issues
should not block the necessary improvement in the procedures. In-
stead, no matter how the information is processed, presented, or de-
bated, the resulting decisions should be better if the scientific proof is
more complete and more accurate. And since forensic science affects
many trials and investigations, a significant increase in the complete-
ness and accuracy of the resulting data will produce more accurate
decisions in litigation.
Jose's decade-old case has led me to conclusions about how to
improve forensic science evidence in our courts and investigations,
but perhaps forensic science itself indicates an important way to im-
prove decisions and inferences in litigation generally. We do need to
know more about how juries and lawyers process information, but
even without that knowledge we can improve decision making. More
21 For a review of the available data on proficiency testing of American forensic laborato-
ries, see Jonakait, supra note 19, at 109-24.
22 "Studies [of clinical labs] consistently discovered that unregulated, unlicensed laborato-
ries performed lower quality work" than their licensed counterparts. Jonakait, supra note 19,
at 173. Armed with this information, Congress chose to regulate all clinical laboratories.
Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903
(1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201).
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accurate and complete "facts" will lead to more accurate results no
matter how that evidence is assimilated and assessed. As forensic sci-
ence indicates, however, the necessary "facts" for more complete liti-
gation must often be developed outside the litigation system. Instead
of simply examining or theorizing how information is collected,
presented, and processed by the various actors within the litigation
system, we need also to examine how, in real life, "facts" can be more
fully developed before they become part of that system.
